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The British Trade Unions 
and the Labour Law 
The Case of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
S.C. Ghosh 
The trade unions* reluctance to accept the reforms envisagea 
in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 is cited as an important exam-
ple of trade unions* intransigence and arrogance and of the fact 
that they consider themselves to be above law. But the way the 
trade unions fought the Act appears to be quite in keeping with 
the démocratie procédure and the rule of law. 
In récent years the trade unions in Britain hâve corne under increasing 
fire.1 It has been suggested that the trade unions were no longer the under-
dog; given the interlocking industrial process, the acceptance of full-
employment as a major économie goal, and the récognition of the union as 
*a realm of the state' and its especial relationship with the Labour Party, the 
unions hâve acquired 'A Giant's Strength' disturbing the power relation-
ships among the various éléments in the body politic and using it to advance 
their sectional interests at the expense of the well-being of the nation as a 
whole. The trade unions hâve had their share of blâme for the récent décline 
in British économie position. They hâve been critieized particularly for the 
pursuit of collective bargaining in a situation of full employment and for 
their reluctance to accept an income and wages policy in a inflationary 
situation. The leaders of the trade unions hâve also been denounced for 
their inability to prevent fréquent unofficial strikes initiated by shop 
stewards2 and rank and file, as well as inter-union disputes which take place 
from time to time because of the multiplicity of unions. It has also been 
claimed that the trade unions are unable to reform their complex outmoded 
structure themselves, but they are also opposed to the government interven-
tions to bring about necessary changes. For example, the Harold Wilson 
Labour Government of 1964-1970 had to abandon its efforts to introduce 
reforms because of their opposition.3 The trade unions' reluctance to accept 
the reforms envisaged in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 is also cited as an 
important example of trade unions' intransigence and arrogance and of the 
fact that they consider themselves to be above law and that the way they 
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defeated the Act was contrary to the rule of law and the parliamentary 
System of government. 
The trade unions' successful struggle against the Act certain]y raises 
several important questions. But the way the trade unions fought the Act 
appears to be quite in keeping with the démocratie procédure and the rule of 
law. 
OPPOSITION AND DEMOCRACY 
Traditionally the théories of political opposition in the west hâve been 
inferred from the development of the concepts of democracy and représen-
tation.4 For example, in Great Britain, political opposition has, for a long 
time, been merged in the public mind with a concept of party compétition in 
an institutionalized two-party System.5 Thus discussion on opposition has 
been concerned very largely with 'the opposition-in-parliament'.6 But such 
a restricted use of the notion of opposition, as Ellis Katz has argued, betrays 
"ideological bias that values stability over change, consensus over cleavage 
and the élite over the mass".7 Secondly, the term, 'opposition' is far from 
being précise. As Barbare N. McLennan points out: "When discussing 
'political opposition' one can be referring to total systematic opposition, as 
that of revolutionary groups; to moderate différences in policy among in-
stitutionalized groups such as courts, législatures, and political parties; or to 
more informai opposition of interest groups or generalized social group-
ings."8 In fact, the terms, disobedience, résistance, protest etc. are often us-
ed in the same sensé as opposition.9 
Much more relevantly for the purpose of the présent discussion, no 
discussion of opposition is today complète without account being taken of 
interest groups. In 'the collectivist politics' of Modem Britain involving the 
assumption of responsibility by the government of the management of the 
economy, the consultation between the government and représentatives of, 
for instance, trade unions and industry, hâve become institutionalized in 
various mixed organs.10And pressure by producers and other groups on the 
government hâve "to some extent bypassed the vertical political représenta-
tion of the political parties".11 Indeed, as G.C. Moodie and G. Studdert-
Kennedy observe: "...pressure groups dérive much of their influence and 
status from their capacity successfully to oppose governement..."12 
It is open to debate whether the institutions of government which en-
shrine the principle of party représentation and party opposition are adé-
quate to tackle the problem of group représentation and opposition.13 But 
given the présent institutions, the effectiveness of a group dépends on 
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whether a government wishes to heed a group, whether it requires groups' 
advice, information, support and other kinds of assistance. Moodie and 
Studdert-Kennedy point out: "Essentially, various forms of actual or 
potential, active or passive, non-cooperation may be, or seen to be, the only 
course open to a group which does not receive the hearing to which it feels 
entitled."14 
Apart from the institutionalized opposition, that is, 'opposition-in-
parliament', the traditional libéral démocratie theory permits only conscien-
tious objection. As Cari Friederich points out: "..., it has been very general-
ly conceded that 'conscience', especially when religiously motivated, entitl-
ed a man to non-participation at least from a moral point of view, provided 
he was willing to 'take the conséquences'."15 However, the traditional 
démocratie theory has been concerned more with the normative right to 
résistance rather than with the empirical analysis of résistance or opposi-
tion.16 
Several empirical studies show that ail forms of extra-parliamentary 
opposition are not subversive of the political System. For example, 'protest' 
as practised by éléments of the civil rights movement in the United States 
has been defined as 'a mode of political action oriented toward objection to 
one or more policies or conditions, characterised by showmanship or 
display of an unconventional nature and undertaken to obtain rewards 
from political or économie Systems while working within the System."17 
However, it seems that révolution or internai war, political violence or 
collective violence hâve received more attention from the scholars rather 
than différent forms of peaceful protest, démonstration and résistance.18 
Much more importantly, no systematic attempt has been made to classify 
the various forms of opposition and to indicate their consistency or other-
wise with the démocratie procédure. Clearly terrorism,19 direct action in-
volving violence and deliberate confrontation with authority and police are 
not in keeping with the démocratie procédure.20 One could also argue that 
non-violent civil disobedience, as practised by Gandhi in the thirties in India 
against the British colonial administration, whose object is a challenge to 
the whole System of government, is not consistent with democracy.21 But it 
could perhaps be argued that the non-violent non-cooperation with a 
spécifie law, provided the persons or groups practising it are willing to 'take 
the conséquences', is an extension of the principle of 'conscientious objec-
tion' and is in keeping with the démocratie procédure.22 
The paper argues that the union actions against the Industrial Relations 
Act 1971 did not amount to a violation of 'the rule of law' nor did they con-
stitue a breakdown in démocratie procédure. The TUC first tried to in-
fluence the Government's décision by représentation; then they fought the 
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Act on what might be described a three-pronged strategy — non-
cooperation with the Act, an understanding with the Confédération of 
British Industry with a view to isolating the government and making the Act 
simply irrelevant and redundant, and an agreement with the Labour Party 
with a view to securing the repeal of the Act. 
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1971 — AN OUTLINE 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was the outcome of the Conser-
vatives' belief in the need to radically restructure power in industrial rela-
tions.23 It was, in the words of the Guardian, "an attempt to tip the scales of 
the industrial bargains quite sharply against the unions."24 It is not possible 
to give hère a detailed account of the Act.25 Broadly, the Act sought to bring 
about an altération in the power relationship in four ways. Firstly, the Act 
sought to bring the unions under government surveillance. Secondly, it tried 
to strengthen the power of the employers. Thirdly, it provided the in-
dividual worker protection against trade union pressure and intimidation. 
Finally, it sought to strike at the power of the shop stewards. 
To bring about the necessary changes, the Conservative Government 
decided that the principle of voluntarism on which the British industrial 
relations rested should give way to detailed and complex régulation; that the 
British System should be reshaped 'in ways that would make it very similar 
to the United States modeP.26 
The main device by which the Act tried to bring the unions under the 
régulation and supervision of Government was by the registration of 
unions. Registration under the Trade Union Act 1871 was voluntary. The 
fact that a union was not registered in no way affected its right to engage in 
collective bargaining or to take strike action. The main advantage that a 
registered union enjoyed was exemption from income tax in respect of in-
terests and dividends for provident funds. Of the TUC's affiliated unions, 
twenty-one (with a total membership of 1,110,600) were not at the time 
registered. However, the Act did not make it obligatory for the Unions to 
register, but it put the unregistered unions at a disadvantage. 
To be eligible for registration, a union's rules and structure must con-
form to the principles embodied in the Act. One of the main objectives of 
the Conservative Government was to transform the internai structure of 
unions in accordance with their belief that the imposition of central authori-
ty by unions and the exercise of discipline over members would bring about 
a major improvement in industrial relations. Thus the registered unions 
were required to indicate in their rules to the satisfaction of the Registrar (a) 
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both the extent and manner in which the union had power to control the ac-
tivities of its branches; (b) the powers and duties of the governing body and 
of each officer and officiais, and (c) 'the description of persons eligible for 
membership' and no exclusion from membership by way of 'arbitrary or 
unreasonable discrimination'. 
In order to bring ail unions within the ambit of the law and the 
surveillance by the Registrar, and to undermine the power of the shop 
stewards, the Act placed unregistered unions at considérable disadvantages. 
For example, no unregistered union could apply to the National Industrial 
Relations Court (NIRC) for the establishment of a bargaining unit. Much 
more importantly, an unregistered union and its officiais would no longer 
hâve the protection from liability for inducing breach of contract in fur-
therance of a trade dispute. 
Apart from putting the shop stewards on the défensive, the Act banned 
political strikes, sympathetic strikes, inter-union strikes etc. It confined 
strike action to the furtherance of 'an industrial dispute', that is, disputes 
mainly relating to terms and conditions of employment. 
Besides restricting the scope of strike, the Act provided for 'a cooling 
off period', that is, when negotiations had failed, the Government could ap-
ply to the NIRC for an order for deferment of industrial action for up to 60 
days, or for a secret ballot where there was doubt as to the amount of sup-
port for strike action, in cases of disputes which threatened the national 
economy, health and security, or created risk of serious public disorder or 
danger to life. 
The Act sought to strengthen the hands of employers. It placed the 
responsibility for carrying out collective bargaining and ensuring the obser-
vance of collective agreements on the unions and employers. It imposed 
obligations on the union to ensure observance of agreements which were 
legally enforceable. However, wittingly or unwittingly, the Government 
provided the unions and employers with a route to escape the rigour of the 
provisions relating to collective bargaining by inserting a clause in their 
agreement that they were not meant to be legally binding. 
The Act sought to provide individual workers with greater security of 
employment, and protection against coercive action by the union.27 Apart 
from the protection afforded by the clarity of the union rules in regard to 
conditions of membership, of expulsion etc., the Act established the right to 
belong or not to belong to a trade union. It banned pre-entry closed shop 
agreement. ('Closed shop' refers to a situation in which employées corne to 
realise that a particular job is only to be obtained and retained if they 
become and remain members of one of a specified number of trade 
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unions.28) However, the Act allowed the employées to set up an 'agency 
shop', that is, one in which ail employées were expected to join the union 
a/ter getting their jobs provided a majority of employées wanted them and 
provided they provided for adéquate safeguards against misuse of trade 
union authority and did not bar employment to genuine 'non-conformists'. 
However, those who still did not want to joint the union would be required 
to pay a sum equal to the subscription either to the union funds or to an ap-
propriate charity. 
Besides incorporating the industrial Tribunals, the Commission on In-
dustrial Relations and the Industrial Arbitration Board into the scheme of 
the Act, it set up the Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) with status similar 
to a High Court to adjudicate on major issues. 
REPRESENTATION AND PRESSURE 
There could be différences of opinion on whether the reforms envisag-
ed by the Act were désirable or not. The Conservatives could well argue that 
reform of the industrial relations were an intégral part of their attempt to 
put Britain back on her feet; and that they had the public opinion behind 
their reforms and that they had a 'mandate' to put it into practice.29 But 
there could hardly be any disagreement on whether the trade unions felt im-
perilled by the Act. Victor Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC, 
declared that the Bill was "an attempt to weaken the trade union move-
ment."30 It was, claimed another trade union leader, "not an Act to deal 
with industrial relations but an act to deal with power."31 Hugh Scanlon, 
Président of the Amalgamated Engineering Workers' Union (AEWU), 
observed: "...it is a class attack, aimed at transforming our Movement into 
a tame sub-department of the State."32 Referring to the effect that the Act 
would hâve on the structure of the Unions, Jack Jones, the leader of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), characterised the Act as 
"a bulwark of bureaucracy": "It seeks to give the unions the alternative of 
taking ail décisions at the centre by bureaucratie, authoritative methods or 
forcing massive penalties if things go wrong locally."33 
Realising that the Conservatives might give effect to their industrial 
relations policy, the TUC had affirmed in its annual conférence in 
September, 1970 "The need to préserve the voluntary basis of industrial 
relations System" and to oppose "the imposition of any législation restric-
ting the freedom of the trade union movement, in particular proposais for 
the légal enforcement of collective agreements and compulsory cooling-off 
periods."34 
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The TUC made an effort to influence the government's décision before 
the publication of the Consultative Document. (As distinguished from the 
White Paper, which lays down government policy, a consultative document 
puts forward a set of tentative proposais for public discussion and com-
ment.) But the Secretary of State for Employment, Robert Carr, informed 
them that he would only be prepared to meet them after the publication of 
the Consultative Document.35 
The TUC received a copy of the Consultative Document on October 5 
and was asked to submit their comments within six weeks. The TUC im-
mediately urged that in view of the wide and complex issues raised in the 
Document, the time for comments should be extended beyond November 
13. But at the meeting between the TUC and Mr. Carr, the latter made it 
clear that the Government was not willing to extend the deadline for con-
sultation as the Government was not prepared to delay the publication of 
the Bill. Mr. Carr also told the TUC délégation that the main principles of 
the Government's proposai were non-negotiable.36 
The Bill was published on December 3. It followed the Consultative 
Document fairly closely and such changes as it contained were not helpful 
to the trade unions. The TUC leaders concluded that the Government was 
not prepared to enter into meaningful discussions with them on the merit of 
its proposais, and decided to initiate a public campaign against the Bill. 
As a first step the TUC held in November 1970 at the Congress House a 
conférence of the principal officers of ail affiliated unions to devise ways 
and means of organising the campaign of opposition. In the next place, they 
held a séries of weekend sessions to equip the fulltime officers of the unions 
with teaching materials and some training in using them to conduct day 
schools and other training sessions to brief workplace représentatives, local 
officiais and active members about the implications of the Bill for the trade 
union movement. In order to organise thèse training sessions, two tutors' 
conférences, each for about 35 tutors, were held in late November. The 
24-hour training conférence took place in December and January. In ail 28 
conférences were held. 1700 union full-time officers and régional représen-
tatives attended them.37 
In order to mobilise the rank and file opposition, the TUC held nine 
régional conférences in the major cities of England and Wales. It also 
organised with Trades Councils and trade union branches 118 meetings in 
1971. 
The TUC published a number of pamphlets and leaflets such as Reason 
in order to educate its own rank and file in, and to inform the gênerai public 
of, the TUC s case against the législation. Three advertisements were in-
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serted in January, February and March 1971 in major national dailies and 
the 21 provincial newspapers with 30 million readers at a total cost of 
£51,000. Six million copies of a leaflet, Shut Up and Keep Working, were 
delivered to households in 102 towns in Britain by local trade unionists. The 
TUC also organised a mass pétition and presented it to the House of Com-
mons on March 24, 1971, the day before the Industrial Relations Bill was 
given its Third Reading. Because of a postal dispute at the time the distribu-
tion and the collection of pétition forms were severely impeded and it ob-
tained only 549,391 signatures.38 
The highlights of this public campaign were two national démonstra-
tions on January 12 and February 21. On January 12, affiliated unions 
organised local meetings at workshops during meal breaks and after hours 
and then they held a national rally at the Albert Hall in London in the even-
ing. The Albert Hall meeting was addressed by Harold Wilson, the Leader 
of the Opposition and Professor Weddenburn of the London University 
and Victor Feather.39 On February 21, an estimated 140,000 trade unionists 
marched through London from Hyde Park Corner to Trafalgar Square and 
the Embankment.40 
While the campaign succeeded in drawing public attention to the 
unions' opposition to the Bill, it failed to make an impact on the govern-
ment. 
NON-COOPERATION WITH THE ACT 
Having failed to change the Government's policy by représentation and 
public campaign, the trade unions decided to boycott the législation. 
However, not ail the trade unionists were agreed about either the practicali-
ty of opposing the législation or how best to do it. 
There were those who wanted to collaborate with the Act not so much 
because they liked the Act but because they felt that they required the ad-
vantage of an 'agency shop' as their work force was very unstable, 
engagements often of very short duration and unemployment high. At the 
other end of the spectrum of opinion were the extremists who constituted a 
small minority. Beyond expressing the belief that the trade unions should 
fight the Government on as wide a front as possible by strike action, they 
were vague and hésitant on spécifie action. 
However, the policies that the TUC pursued were a compromise bet-
ween the cautious opposition led by Victor Feather and the other moderate 
leaders, and the radical opposition represented by Jack Jones and Hugh 
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Scanlon. Both the sections were agreed about the need to corne to an 
understanding with the Labour Party for the eventual repeal of the Act and 
to avoid confrontation with the employers and seek their co-operation to 
bypass the Act. They, however, differed on the question of the use of 
limited strike action. While the modérâtes were on principle opposed to ail 
forms of strike action, the radical éléments were in favour of limited strike 
action. There was another important différence. Unlike the radicals, the 
modérâtes were not in favour of mandatory non-registration; while recom-
mending non-registration they wanted to leave the décision to individual 
unions. 
There were, however, important différences within what we hâve 
described somewhat arbitrarily as the radical camp. Jack Jones' attitude to 
strike action was somewhat ambivalent. But Hugh Scanlon had no qualms 
about it. Secondly, unlike Scanlon, Jack Jones was not prepared to en-
courage action not authorised by the TUC. Thirdly, faced by the threat of 
massive fines for failure to comply with the orders of the Industrial Rela-
tions Court, Jack Jones was in favour of appearing in defence before the 
Court. But Hugh Scanlon remained uncompromising.41 
The main initiative for an extrême militant line came from the paper 
workers, SOGAT (Society of Graphical and Allied Trades — Division I) 
and from the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Free Trade Unionism. 
The Liaison Committee for the Defence of Free Trade Unionism has 
been characterized as one of the 'front' bodies of the Communist Party.42 It 
was undoubtedly under communist influence, but it attracted the support of 
ail sorts of people from the old fashioned Labour Party left wingers, Trot-
skyists, to many rank and file workers dissatisfied with the modération of 
the trade union leadership. It was set up early in 1966 to fight the Harold 
Wilson Government's Priées and Incomes Policy. It was responsible for the 
1969 May Day strike in protest at the Labour Government's attempt to 
reform industrial relations. Though it severely disrupted the docks and 
newspaper production, the strike call went largely unheeded in industry.43 
The Liaison Committee for the Defence of Free Trade Unionism 
organised a conférence of shop stewards in the middle of November, 1970 
in order to rally them against the législation. About 2,000 shop stewards 
from ail sectors of industry were présent. It was, indeed, 'the biggest gather-
ing of trade union militants in récent years'.44 
There were calls for a gênerai strike from the floor, but the delegates 
proceeded cautiously and called for a one day strike on December 8,1970 — 
which was officially supported by three unions, other than the SOGAT, 
Constructional Engineers, Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians, 
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Lightermen.45 The strike was not very successful; between 350,000 and 
600,000 workers struck.46 
The Liaison Committee called another conférence on April 24, 1971. 
But only half of the delegates who had attended the first meeting turned up. 
For lack of support and enthusiasm, they decided not to adopt a proposai 
for further strike action. Instead they decided to strengthen the hands of the 
radicals and the other extremist éléments in the TUC.47 
The SOGAT made attempts to persuade the Trades Union Congress to 
adopt an extrême militant line. But ail that they could muster was 234,000 
votes of which it itself commanded 192,000. 9,789,000 votes were cast 
against their Une.48 
The Congress not only rejected the industrial action as a major strategy 
but it also refused, by a narrow majority, roughly five to four, to endorse 
and use a limited strike action.49 
The issue was raised at the Spécial Trades Union Congress in Croydon 
on March 18, 1971.50 Both Scanlon and Jack Jones had called an officiai 
strike on the lst March, which had a limited success.51 On the very day the 
TUC was meeting in Croydon, there was a strike organized by Scanlon's 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Union and supported at the last mo-
ment by Jack Jones' Transport Workers.52 In the next place, in its Report to 
the Congress, the General Councirs rejection of the industrial action was 
hedged in with qualifications; it rejected it not on grounds of principle, but 
on practical grounds.53 
But in his speech to the Congress, Victor Feather, rejected the use of 
the industrial action in no uncertain terms. He made it clear that the TUC 
did not consider itself above law and was only thinking of non-cooperation 
with the Act and the machineries it had set up: 
"The fact that a law is offensive to a particular grouping of people cloes 
not entitle that grouping, no matter now vast and how important it is, 
deliberately to break the law. Trade Unionists are not either individually 
or collectively above the law or outside the law and hâve never wished to 
be so... 
Instead, they are proposing that the movement should adopt a policy 
of non-cooperation. By that they mean that unions should refrain from 
availing themselves of any of the so-called advantages conferred by the 
Act; that they should avoid in every legitimate way the limitations that the 
Act seeks to impose."54 
Although no systematic attempt to use the strike action in order to 
defeat the législation was made, there were still occasional strikes or threat 
of strike. 
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For example, the TUC itself threatened to call a strike when five 
dockers were put into jail. Following picketing by dockers, the Midland 
Cold Storage Ltd., Hackney, complained on July 7, 1972 to the NIRC 
which issued an intérim order, to seven dockers to refrain from threatening 
to black company. ('Blacking' takes place when a union puts a ban to work-
ing for, and servicing, a company.) On 21 July the Court found that five of 
the seven dockers had disobeyed the order and ruled that they be imprison-
ed, which they were. 
The trade unionists were outraged. The TUC leaders met on 24 July the 
Prime Minister, Edward Heath, and pressed him for their release. They em-
phasized that the longer they were imprisoned, the worse the situation 
would become and that widespread industrial action would ensue. Heath 
told them that the government was also deeply concerned about the possible 
économie conséquences, but the government could not interfère with the 
opération of the Courts. 
However, the TUC leaders were disappointed at the outeome of their 
conversation with the Prime Minister. The General Council decided on 26 
July to call on affiliated unions to organise a one-day stoppage of work and 
démonstrations on Monday, 31 July for the release of the five dockers. 
However, the Government had second thoughts and later on the same day 
the men were released, and the threatened strike was called off.55 
Following the compulsory collection of the fine of £55,000 by the 
NIRC for défiance of its orders, the AEUW called on its members to "dé-
fend the policy of the union,\ On 11 December, 1972 about 1,000 of 13,000 
workers of Sudbury factory of CAV Ltd. struck and next day décisions to 
call out engineering workers in London, Manchester, Oxford and 
Dagenham and elsewhere were taken. The day fixed for this strike, 18 
December, saw 100,000 engineering workers out, with the total rising to an 
estimate of 165,000 on 20 December. After that the protest died away.56 
Although Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon were unsuccessful in securing 
the support of the TUC to the use of the limited strike action, they were suc-
cessful in persuading the Congress to accept eventually their policy on non-
registration. It has been seen that it was through the device or registration 
that the Government sought to bring the unions under its surveillance, 
although the unions were not obliged to register. 'Collaborators' were ail in 
favour of registration. While agreed on a policy of non-registration, the 
modérâtes and radicals differed on the question whether the TUC should 
merely recommend to its affiliated unions non-registration or should re-
quire them to pursue a policy of non-registration. 
262 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 2 (1980) 
At the Spécial Congress held in March, 1971 in Croydon, the TUC 
upheld the voluntary non-registration by 5,055,000 to 4,284,000, i.e., a ma-
jority of 771,000.î7 But at the Congress held in September in the sarne year, 
it reversed its décision by a majority of 1,125,000, despite the pleadings by 
Victor Feather and the other moderate leaders to stand by the Croydon 
décision.58 What made the majority of trade unionists change their mind 
was the fear that short of a binding policy, a great number of unions would 
opt for collaboration with the Act. As The Times reported at the time: "A 
change of policy by the woodworkers and public employées' union largely 
accounted for the reversai of this today..."59 
Encouraged by their success at the TUC Annual Conférence of 1971 
and exasperated by several légal proceedings brought against their unions 
before the NIRC, Hugh Scanlon, backed by Jack Jones, went ail out in the 
next Annual Conférence to secure the support of the rank and file to com-
mit the TUC to a tougher line of action, "to build a campaign of industrial 
action designed to defeat the government and its policies of légal restrictions 
on the trade union movement.',6° But the rank and file rejected their motion 
by a majority of 2,198,000.61 (The original motion tabled by the Engineer-
ing Union did not mention that the campaign of défiance should be directed 
by the TUC leadership, but at the insistence of the Transport Workers' 
Union, the resolution was amended to include this.) 
Thus the policy that the TUC pursued was a compromise between the 
position adopted by the modérâtes led by Victor Feather and the radicals led 
by Jack Jones. The compromise was possible as a number of unions in-
cluding the National Union of Public Employées, Association of 
Cinematograph Télévision and Allied Technicians, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) switched their position.62 However, in supporting the 
mandatory non-registration they did not, as the NUM made it clear, go over 
to the stronger line of the AUEW and TGWU.63 
Two other points should be noted. First: the division of opinion eut 
across various types of union. The six big unions took différent lines. While 
National Union of Municipal Workers Union and Union of Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Workers Union backed the moderate line, the 
radical line was spearheaded by the Engineering and Transport Workers' 
Unions. While the NUM cast its vote on spécifie issue, the National Union 
of Railwaymen remained non-committal. The white collar unions were also 
divided among themselves. For example, Clive Jenkins' Association of 
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff backed the radical line, but the 
National and Local Government Officers Association supported the 
moderate line. The manual workers were also ranged in opposite camps. 
Thus the Union of Post Office Workers backed the radical line, but the Na-
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tional Union of Agricultural and Allied workers voted for the moderate 
line. Second: except for a hardcore of collaborators and the occasional dé-
fiance of the strike décision, the minorities accepted and adhered to, the 
décisions of the majority. 
Faced with the grave implications of expulsion several unions such as 
the United Society of Engineers, Electrical Power Engineers' Association, 
Society of Shuttlemakers, Scottish Union of Power and Loom Overlookers, 
Scottish Union of Bakers deregistered themselves. However, the National 
Graphical Association, which had been suspended, withdrew from affilia-
tion to the TUC in October, 1972. Another 20 Unions with a total member-
ship of 370,000 refused to deregister themselves and to fall in line. Most of 
them were very small unions with the exception of the National Union of 
Seamen. Thèse 20 unions were eventually expelled.64 However, every effort 
was made to persuade them to fall in line.65 They were also given oppor-
tunities to represent their case both to the General Council and the TUC and 
were heard in both forums with dignity and propriety.66 It appears that the 
TUC eventually expelled them only with great reluctance. Nor did the TUC 
show any vindictiveness. Once the Act was repealed and the controversy 
was over, the TUC received ail of them back into its fold with the exception 
of a very small union — the National Union of Basket Cane Workers and 
Fibre Furniture Makers with a recorded membership of 48 which disbanded 
itself after its suspension.67 
Non-cooperation with the Court 
The TUC's boycott of the Act and its institutions led to mass résigna-
tions from the panel representing the employée side of industry for service 
on the Industrial Tribunal. By April 1972, 162 of a total of 201 trade union 
nominees on Tribunals had resigned. Of the remaining 39 nominees, 17 
refused to resign. Maurice Macmillan, Secretary of State for Employment 
acknowledged on November 19, 1973: "There are no officiai trade union 
nominees".68 The Government had to alter the représentation so that 
members could be drawn from one panel with knowledge and expérience of 
industry. 
In addition there were several notable résignations. In March 1971 
George Woodcock, the former TUC General Secretary, resigned his 
£11,000 a year job as the Chairman of the Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions.69 Two other members, Will Paynter and Alfred Allen, had already 
resigned in December 1970 in protest at the rôle assigned to the Industrial 
Relations Commission by the Bill.70 
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But complète non-cooperation with the National Industrial Relations 
Court proved difficult. Several actions were brought against some unions 
by a few employers, and individuals for alleged 'unfair industrial actions'. 
In particular the Transport and General Workers' Union and the Engineer-
ing Union found themselves in an invidious position. Both the Unions were 
faced with massive fines for breach of the pénal provision of the Act and for 
contempt of the Court for failure to carry out the Court's orders. For exam-
ple, the Transport and General Workers Unions was faced on April 21, 
1972 with a fine of £55,000 for continuing contempt of the Court, for its 
failure to stop the dock workers from 'blacking' the vehicles of Heaton's 
Transport (St Helens) Ltd. (The case arose out of a dispute between two 
groups of workers belonging to two différent sections of the Transport and 
General Workers' Union as a resuit of the spread of containerization. 
Dockworkers wanted to ensure that containers were 'stuffed and stripped' 
by themselves and not by road transport workers at inland container 
dépôts. To achieve this, during the early months of 1972 they 'blacked' the 
lorries of a number of transport companies engaged in this work and 
picketed transport dépôts.)71 
The Président of the NIRC, Sir John Donaldson, made it clear on 20 
April 1972 that the TCWU's funds would be sequestered if the fines of 
£55,000 were not paid by 4 May.72 On 24 April, the TUC General Purposes 
Committee decided to allow unions to défend themselves before Court.73 
The TGWU allowed itself to be represented for the first time on 3 May. 
Since then several unions were represented before the Court, where their in-
terests had been threatened, or where they stood to gain from the resolution 
of a récognition dispute. 
However, Scanlon's AUEW persisted in a complète boycott and dé-
fiance of the Court, which cost it fines of £55,000 over the Goad case, and 
£75,000 over the Con-Mich case in November 1973.74 
The trade unions, however, received a shot in the arm when the 
Government invoked the emergency provisions of the Act on the occasion 
of the railway dispute. After negotiations on a pay claim had broken down, 
the three railway unions ASLEF (Associated Society of Locomotive 
Engineers and Firemen), NUR (National Union of Railwaymen) and TSSA 
(Transport Salaried Staffs' Association) instructed their members to work 
to rule from midnight on 16 April, 1972, with the resuit that existing disrup-
tion of rail services arising from unofficial action was sharply increased. 
Maurice Macmillan, then Secretary of State for Employment, applied 
to the Court for 'a cooling-off period under section 138 and on 19 April 
was granted one of 14 days during which the work to rule ceased. 
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The TUC leaders had warned the Secretary of State for Employment 
that the Government appeared to be acting hastily and to be ruling out any 
possibility of further negotiations. They told the government that the dif-
férence between the Railway Board and the railway unions appeared to be 
marginal and could be settled by negotiations. And they advised that a com-
pulsory ballot was unnecessary. 
The cooling-of f period expired on 8 May and industrial action resumed 
the following day. The Government applied on 11 May to the NIRC for a 
ballot of railwaymen. The unions opposed this in the NIRC hearing (held 
on 11, 12 and 13 May). The NIRC ordered the ballot on May 13. The 
Unions appealed immediately to the Court of Appeal, which, however, 
upheld on 19 May the NIRC's judgement. 
Meanwhile, since 13 May the CIR had been arranging for the ballot to 
take place and the industrial action suspended in accordance with an order 
by the NIRC. The ballot results were declared on 31 May and showed over-
whelming support for the unions' leadership. 129,441 railway workers ef-
fectively voted in support of the three unions, 23,181 voted against, and 
1,567 abstained.75 The results were a set back for the government, for one of 
its assumptions had been that the rank and file trade unionists were 
moderate and given opportunity to détermine strike décisions were likely to 
oppose them. 
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE CBI 
The Confédération of British Industries (CBI) and the employers oc-
cupied a stratégie position in the Unions' campaign of non-cooperation 
with the Act and its machineries. As The Guardian put it in a leading article 
on the publication of the Consultative Document: "...the onus for taking 
action under ail its principal provisions still lies with employers. Will they 
use the new opportunities for litigation? Those who are experienced in 
labour relations probably will not. They know that in the unhappy cir-
cumstances when a stand up fight with a union becomes inévitable the law 
will offer them little help."76 
Since 1965 the Confédération of British Industries had been in favour 
of changes in the law which would improve industrial relations. British 
employers had been, the CBI told the Donovan Royal Commission, "ex-
tremely reluctant in the past to go to law on industrial relations matters (e.g. 
to sue for damages for breach of contract), but they were willing to consider 
changes in the law which would on balance improve industrial relations."77 
The CBI specifically asked, among others, for légal enforcement of collec-
tive agreements, restriction of légal immunity in tort to registered trade 
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unions and to acts in furtherance of a trade dispute between workers and 
their employers, and strikes and other industrial action in accordance with 
agreed procédures or strikes after appropriate notice to terminate employ-
ment had been given, new powers for Registrar of Trade Unions.78 
The CBI welcomed the Industrial Relations Bill. They, however, had 
réservations on two points. They thought that the pre-entry closed shop 
should not be outlawed if both the parties agreed that such an arrangement 
should exist. Secondly, and perhaps much more importantly, the CBI felt 
that the proposed new Registrar of Trade Unions should be provided with 
wider and stronger powers; that the Registrar should police labour 
agreements rather than leaving the onus on employers to deal with 
récalcitrant workers and unions. The CBI made it clear to the Government 
that few employers would take their industrial problems to the NIRC 
because of the conséquent damages that might be done to a company's 
labour relations.79 
But the Government resisted the CBI's two demands. Finding that the 
TUC and most of the Unions were determined to resist the Act, the CBI 
decided to sit on the fence. They adopted the attitude that it was a matter 
between the government and the unions, and they advised their members 
not to provoke the Unions. Thus faced with the prospect of a strike on 
January 12, 1971 the CBI merely recorded: "We strongly déplore any in-
dustrial action for political reasons that disrups production in this critical 
inflationary period. We are only concerned with what happens inside work-
ing hours, so we cannot criticise the officiai TUC line, nor can we criticize 
individual trade unions. We hâve to wait and see what happens."80 
Far from taking légal action against the individual unions and insisting 
on legally binding collective agreements, the employers helped practically 
the Unions to bypass the Act. Most employers did not support attempt by 
the non-TUC unions and staff associations to secure récognition; no union 
had any difficulty in incorporating a not-legally enforceable clause in collec-
tive agreements; a few employers had made allégations of unfair industrial 
practices to the NIRC which had in a very few cases created difficulties in-
cluding heavy fines on TGUW and AUEW, but employers in gênerai had 
understood that the threat of légal action against the unions and their 
members were more likely to cause a détérioration in an industrial situation 
than to assist in promoting seulement.81 
Pressed by the TUC, the CBI had declared its agreement with the TUC 
that "collective bargaining is best brought to a satisfactory conclusion by 
voluntary means", and had advised the employers not to use the Act 
without carefully considering ail the possible implications.82 
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The CBI further agreed with the TUC that "the conflict between 
Government's rôle as manager of the economy on the one hand, and as 
agent for the promotion of industrial peace on the other has undoubtedly 
weakened the confidence of unions in the impartiality of government-
produced conciliation and arbitration, particularly in pay disputes.''83 And 
the CBI fully cooperated with the TUC to set up a new non-governmental 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service first to deal with disputes of major im-
portance in which a stoppage of work had occurred or was apprehended.84 
Finally, the CBI came to the conclusion before the end of September, 
1973 that far from improving the industrial relations, the Act had worsened 
them. A working party of eight leading CBI members produced a confiden-
tial report suggesting changes including abandonment of the proposed 
registration requirements, and end to légal enforceability of collective 
agreements, and possible repeal of the emergency powers for secret ballots 
and 'cooling-off periods', which might be introduced.85 
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE LABOUR PARTY 
The relations between the political and industrial wing had become 
very strained folio wing the Wilson Government's attempt to introduce 
reforms in the industrial relations.86 But the trade unions' intense opposi-
tion to the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 brought the two sides together and 
helped heal the breach between them and laid the foundations for Wilson-
Callaghan Labour Governments which first took office in February 1974. 
What the TUC wanted was an unequivocal déclaration from 'the 
political movement' that the next Labour Government would repeal the 
heinous Act. The Left-wing Tribune Group was first to suggest that a 
Labour Government should do so.87 
But aware of the fact that the Labour Government of 1964-70 had tried 
to reform industrial relations and mindful of the conséquence such an 
understanding would hâve on the public opinion, the leadership of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) held out and made the pledge to repeal 
the Act conditional on a constructive alternative to législative reforms. Thus 
the PLP called upon in December 9, 1970 "the National Executive Commit-
tee of the Labour Party (NEC), in conjunction with the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress to develop a constructive 
alternative to the Tory Bill which will ensure workable accord between the 
future Labour Government and the Unions and members to be put to the 
electorate as a firm basis for the repeal of the Industrial Relations Bill now 
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before Parliament."88 Harold Wilson, speaking to the Albert Hall rally on 
January 12, 1971 reiterated the call.89 
This failure on the part of the PLP to give a prompt unconditional 
pledge rankled many trade unionists, who were still smouldering under 
resentments against the PLP for having supported the Wilson 
Government's attempt to introduce reforms embodied in the White Paper, 
In Place ofStrife.90 
While giving vent to the trade unionists' sensé of frustration and disap-
pointments at the Wilson Government's responsibility in opening the pan-
dora's box of the industrial relations reforms and at the PLP leaclership's 
hésitation in giving an immédiate undertaking, T. Jackson of the Union of 
Post Office Workers moved successfully a resolution the terms of which 
were not very différent from those laid down by the PLP on December 9.91 
Having agreed on the immédiate repeal of the Industrial Relations Act 
and on the principle of voluntary as distinguished from statutory reforms, 
the TUC, NEC and the PLP established in January, 1972 a Liaison Com-
mittee comprising six représentatives from each body to work out *a con-
structive alternative to the Act.'92 The TUC were represented by Victor 
Feather, Jack Jones, Hugh Scanlon, Lord Cooper and Sir Sidney Greene. 
The NEC représentatives were Anthony Wedgwood Benn, M.P., Mrs. Bar-
bara Castle, M.P., Ian Mikardo, M.P., J. Chalmers, A. Kitson and Sir 
Harry Nicholas. The PLP was represented by Harold Wilson, James 
Callaghan, Dennis Healey, Douglas Houghton, R. Mellish and Reg Pren-
tice.93 
It was this high powered body which drew up the so-called * social con-
tract' which helped the Labour Party to form a minority government in 
February 1974 and a majority government in October, 1974. It is not possi-
ble to describe hère in détails the terms of this understanding. Broadly 
speaking the Trade Union leaders undertook to cooperate with a Labour 
government to restrain wage demands and help in fighting against the infla-
tion while the Labour Party undertook to repeal the Industrial Relations 
Act and to hold down priées of essential commodities by control and sub-
sidies and to protect the low income group by increase in pensions.94 
The Act was repealed by the Wilson-Callaghan Labour Government 
that came into office in 1974. However, the call for the repeal had corne not 
only from such quarters as the Libéral Party,95 but also from Campbell 
Adamson, the Director-General of the CBI.96 The Conservative Govern-
ment had let be known that it was prepared to review the working of the Act 
and consider constructive amendments to it.97 
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However, the législation which replaced the Act went beyond the repeal 
and aroused intense controversies for making the closed shop légal. 
CONCLUSION 
The way the trade unions fought the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was 
not contrary to the rule of law or the parliamentary System of government. 
They first attempted to influence the government décision by représenta-
tion. But the Government refused to enter into meaningful discussions on 
the principles of the Bill. The doctrine of mandate could be invoked to 
justify such a refusai. But it is, as A.H. Birch points out, inaccurate to por-
tray the British System of government as one in which the electors, by 
preferring one set of policies to another, give the successful party a mandate 
to translate its policies into practice during the ensuing five years. The par-
ties do not usually présent cohérent programmes of action in their élection 
manifestos; they merely outline their gênerai objectives. Second: thèse 
policy statements influence the voting behaviour of only a very small pro-
portion of electors; people are influenced by traditional loyalties, by the 
gênerai image that each party présents and by the record of the government 
of the day, but not to any great extent by élection promises. Third: élection 
promises are a poor guide to the actions of the successful party after it has 
taken over the government: circumstances change, and plans usually hâve 
to be modified accordingly.98 Much more importantly, this refusai to 
negotiate with the trade union on the fundamentals of the Bill constituted a 
departure from the practice and convention of consultation which hâve 
developed since the second World War. This refusai to discuss anything but 
the détails of the Bill was taken as a grave affront by ail trade union leaders. 
And what they found objectionable was not only the substance of the Bill 
but also the manner of enacting it. 
The trade unions then tried unsuccessfully to influence the government 
décision by public campaign — by démonstrations, public meetings, péti-
tion etc. This was quite in keeping with the conventions of pressure group 
activities in Britain (and other western démocraties). Sections of employers 
hâve in the past indulged in such campaigns." What apparently, however, 
went beyond conventional activities was the non-cooperation with the Act. 
Two broad points should be noted. First: given the présent System of 
institutions which enshrine only représentation of parties, a pressure group 
which does not find a hearing from the government has very little room to 
manoeuvre other than public campaign, protest and, as a last resort, non-
cooperation. Second: the traditional démocratie theory precludes us from 
considering realistically forms of opposition which are operative in the 
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western démocraties other than the institutionalized 'opposition-in-
parliament'. It has been argued that peaceful non-violent non-cooperation 
with a spécifie law or policy is an extension of the principle underlying 'con-
scientious objection'. 
However, strictly speaking the trade union opposition even fell short of 
défiance of law. Since registration was voluntary, opposition to it did not 
constitute a challenge to the légal authority of either courts or the govern-
ment. 
Several other points should be noted about this décision to non-
cooperate with the Act and its machineries. First: the trade unions were 
deeply divided over this course of action. But they took their décision in a 
démocratie way; it was imposed neither by an oligarchy of big unions nor by 
a determined minority of rank and file activists. The dissidents, a minority 
of 20 unions, were given every opportunity to represent their case, and rules 
and procédures were meticulously observed in their suspension and expul-
sion. And once the controversy was over, they were accepted back. 
The trade union peacefully non-cooperated with the Act and the 
machineries it set up. There was no violence. Nor was the strike weapon us-
ed systematically to defeat the législation; there were occasional strikes 
more to express the trade unionists' resentments against the Act and the 
Heath Government. Nor did the trade unions extend their non-cooperation 
with the Act to the total boycott of the Government; they continued to 
negotiate with the Government on other matters. They managed to secure 
the assistance of employers and the Confédération of British Industries to 
bypass the Act. Finally, they secured the repeal of the Act through a duly 
constituted Labour Government. 
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Les syndicats et la législation du travail en Grande-Bretagne 
Le cas de L'Industrial Relations Act de 1971 
Au cours des dernières années, les syndicats britanniques ont dû faire face à un 
feu de plus en plus nourri. Leur répugnance à accepter les réformes envisagées par 
P Industrial Relations Act de 1971 est citée comme un exemple significatif de leur in-
transigeance et du fait qu'ils se considèrent au-dessus de la loi. Ainsi, la façon dont 
ils ont combattu cette loi aurait été, dit-on, contraire à la règle de droit et au système 
parlementaire. Mais tel n'est pas le cas. 
U Industrial Relations Act était l'aboutissement de l'opinion conservatrice qui 
croyait à la nécessité d'imposer d'une façon radicale un nouvel aménagement des 
rapports de force dans les relations professionnelles. La loi visait à placer les syndi-
cats sous la surveillance du gouvernement, principalement en les amenant à s'enre-
gistrer de telle manière que ceux qui ne le feraient pas se trouveraient placés dans une 
situation désavantageuse notable, comme, par exemple, le retrait de la protection 
contre la responsabilité à ceux qui inciteraient à la rupture de contrat en vue de faire 
progresser le règlement d'un différend. La loi confinait la grève aux différends rela-
tifs aux conditions de travail; elle interdisait les grèves politiques, les grèves de sym-
pathie et les grèves intersyndicales; elle protégeait les travailleurs pris individuelle-
ment contre les pressions et l'intimidation des syndicats. Outre la protection claire-
ment assurée par les statuts syndicaux en matière de conditions d'admissibilité et 
d'expulsion, etc., la loi établissait le droit d'appartenir ou non à un syndicat; elle in-
terdisait la clause d'atelier fermé avant l'embauchage. 
Les syndicats sentirent leur existence même mise en danger par la loi. Ce n'était 
pas, déclara un dirigeant syndical, «une loi qui traitait des relations de travail, mais 
une loi qui portait sur les rapports de force». 
Les syndicats tentèrent d'abord d'influencer la décision du gouvernement par 
des représentations. Mais le gouvernement refusa de s'engager dans un débat valable 
sur le principe du projet. Ce refus de discuter quoique ce soit, si ce n'est de questions 
de détail, constituait une dérogation à la pratique de la consultation qui était devenue 
courante depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale, et tous les dirigeants syndicaux le res-
sentirent comme un grave affront. Et ce à quoi ils trouvaient le plus à redire, ce 
n'était pas seulement au principe de la loi, mais à la façon de la décréter. 
Ils essayèrent ensuite sans succès d'influencer la décision du gouvernement par 
des campagnes d'opinion: démonstrations, assemblées publiques, requêtes, etc. Ils 
s'en tenaient ainsi aux usages des groupes de pression en Grande-Bretagne (et dans 
les autres démocraties occidentales). Des coalitions d'employeurs s'étaient permis de 
pareilles campagnes dans le passé. Cependant, ce qui apparemment dépassait les 
convenances, c'était leur refus de coopérer à l'application de la loi. 
Compte tenu du système des institutions existantes qui ne consacre que la repré-
sentation des partis, un groupe de pression qui ne trouve pas audience auprès du 
gouvernement n'a guère d'autres ressources que de faire agir l'opinion publique, de 
protester et, en dernier ressort, de refuser de coopérer. La théorie démocratique tra-
ditionnelle nous empêche de considérer avec réalisme les formes d'opposition à 
l'oeuvre dans les démocraties occidentales, si ce n'est celle de l'opposition institu-
tionnelle du Parlement. On peut soutenir que le refus sans violence de se soumettre à 
une loi spécifique est une extension du principe à la base de P«objection de conscien-
278 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 2 (1980) 
ce». Toutefois, l'opposition syndicale n'allait pas jusqu'au défi de la loi. Puisque 
l'enregistrement était volontaire, le refus de s'enregistrer ne constituait pas un défi à 
l'autorité légale des cours ou du gouvernement. 
Les syndicats étaient profondément divisés au sujet de la décision de ne pas coo-
pérer à l'application de la loi mais ils prirent leur décision d'une façon démocratique. 
Elle ne fut imposée ni par une oligarchie de grands syndicats ni par une minorité 
déterminée d'activités de la base. Les dissidents, une minorité de vingt syndicats, eu-
rent tous la possibilité de soumettre leur point de vue et les règlements et les actes de 
procédure furent méticuleusement suivis lors de leur suspension et de leur expulsion. 
Et une fois la controverse terminée, ils purent réintégrer les rangs. 
C'est par des moyens pacifiques que les syndicats n'ont pas collaboré à l'appli-
cation de la loi et des mécanismes qu'elle instituait. Il n'y eut pas de violence. On 
n'utilisa pas non plus systématiquement l'arme de la grève pour faire obstacle à la 
législation. Il y eut quelques grèves occasionnelles surtout en vue d'exprimer le res-
sentiment des syndiqués contre la loi et le gouvernement conservateur. Ils ne poussè-
rent pas non plus leur refus de coopérer jusqu'au boycottage du gouvernement; ils 
continuèrent à négocier avec lui sur d'autres questions. Ils tentèrent de s'assurer l'ai-
de des employeurs et de la Confédération ofBritish Industries pour contourner la loi 
dont ils obtinrent le rappel d'un gouvernement travailliste dûment constitué. 
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